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Abstract
This paper develops an economic theory of the costs and benets of corporate culture { in
the sense of shared beliefs and values { in order to study the eects of `culture clash' in mergers
and acquisitions.
I rst use a simple analytical framework to show that shared beliefs lead to more delegation,
less monitoring, higher utility (or satisfaction), higher execution eort (or motivation), faster
coordination, less inuence activities, and more communication, but also to less experimentation
and less information collection. When two rms that are each internally homogenous but dif-
ferent from each other, merge, the above results translate to specic predictions how the change
in homogeneity will aect rm behavior. The paper's predictions can also serve more in general
as a test for the theory of culture as homogeneity of beliefs.
1 Introduction
Look behind any disastrous [merger] and the same word keeps popping up { culture.
The Economist 1999
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1Culture clash { the potentially destructive eects of combining two organizations with dierent
cultures { is often considered a major cause for the failing of mergers and acquisitions (Kelly, Cook,
and Spitzer 1999, Chang, Curtis, and Jenk 2002). Since the latter are key mechanisms to change a
rm's scope and since their failure is common (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987, Copeland, Koller, and
Murrin 1991, Kaplan and Weisbach 1992, Mitchell and Staord 2000, Shelton 2002), culture clash is
an important consideration for corporate strategy. But its importance doesn't end there. Although
less publicized, culture clash has also plagued alliances and long-term market relationships (Park
and Ungson 2001). And it provides a unique lens on the performance eects of corporate culture
itself, and thus culture's potential to generate a competitive advantage.
This paper draws upon a simple analytical framework to derive a series of specic predictions
regarding the positive and negative eects of corporate culture and of (one form of) culture clash in
mergers and acquisitions. I start, in particular, from the denition of corporate culture as shared
beliefs and values (Schwartz and Davis 1981, Donaldson and Lorsch 1983, Schein 1985, Kotter and
Heskett 1992, Van den Steen 2005a) and formalize this in a simple economic model. In this model,
a rm has to choose a course of action or a way of doing things, but its members { who care about
the success of the rm { may openly disagree on the best approach.1 Culture is then dened as the
degree to which members have similar beliefs about the best way of doing things.
In a rst step, I use this model to systematically derive the eects of shared beliefs and values
on organization behavior and performance. The model shows that shared beliefs lead to more
delegation, less monitoring, higher utility (or satisfaction), higher execution eort (or motivation),
less information collection, less experimentation, faster coordination, less inuence activities, and
less biased communication. The key intuition for why `culture as homogeneity' is such a pervasive
force in this setting is that 1) agency problems arise from dierences in objectives and 2) shared
beliefs and values reduce or eliminate such dierences in objectives, thus eliminating the agency
issues (and their negative and positive consequences) at the root. This link between the general
agency problem, on the one hand, and corporate culture, on the other, is an important underlying
insight of this paper. While the results are formulated in terms of shared beliefs, I will also indicate
1Open disagreement, i.e., the fact that players may agree to disagree, implies that players must have diering
priors (Aumann 1976). I will discuss this assumption at the end of Subsection 2.1.
2which results extend directly to shared values (in the sense of shared preferences).
An interesting and important observation about these results is that the benets of homogeneity
or of a strong culture tend to center around the organization's eciency at doing what it does:
better delegation, less monitoring, higher satisfaction and motivation, faster coordination, better
communication, and less inuence activities. The costs of homogeneity or a strong culture, on
the other hand, center around (not) nding the right thing to do: less experimentation and less
information collection. One way to interpret this is that a strong culture tends to favor exploitation
over exploration.2
In a second step, I then translate the costs and benets identied above to the context of
mergers and acquisitions. In particular, with corporate culture dened as shared beliefs and values,
culture clash is then caused by the merging of two groups that are each internally homogenous but
dierent from each other (in terms of their beliefs and preferences). This generates the following
results:
1. The overall level of delegation will decrease after a merger. A manager in the merged rm is
more likely to delegate if she and her subordinate come from the same pre-merger rm than
if they come from dierent pre-merger rms.
2. The overall level of utility and eort (i.e, of satisfaction and motivation) will decrease after
a merger. An employee in the merged rm will on average have higher satisfaction and
motivation if he and his manager come from the same pre-merger rm than if they come from
dierent pre-merger rms.
3. The overall level of information collection (to convince others) will increase after a merger.
A subordinate in the merged rm will collect more information (to convince others) when he
and his manager come from dierent pre-merger rms than when they come from the same
pre-merger rm.
2In some cases, it is important to be clear about the dimensions of exploitation and exploration. A rm can, for
example, have a strong culture of innovation, thus exploring the product space. But innovation is typically costly
and therefore not always optimal. In such cases, rms with a strong culture of innovation will tend to over-innovate
rather than exploring non-innovation. Such rm is then an explorer in the product space but an exploiter in the
strategy space.
34. The overall level of experimentation will increase after a merger. Two employees in the
merged rm are more likely to undertake dierent actions when they come from dierent
pre-merger rms than when they come from the same pre-merger rm.
5. Coordination will take more time after a merger. Two employees in the merged rm will
coordinate more quickly when they come from the same pre-merger rm than when they
come from dierent pre-merger rms.
6. The overall level of inuence activities will increase after a merger. Two employees in the
merged rm are more likely to engage in inuence activities when they come from dierent
pre-merger rms than when they come from the same pre-merger rm.
7. The overall distortion of communication will increase after a merger. A subordinate in the
merged rm is more likely to distort communication when he and his manager come from
dierent pre-merger rms than when they come from the same pre-merger rm.
This interpretation of culture clash is consistent with the informal observation that employees will
sometimes years after a merger still refer to a colleague's pre-merger origin rm as an explanation
for his or her behavior.
It is useful to point out that { beyond their importance in their own right, which is the focus
of this paper { these predictions have another important use: they provide readily observable and
thus testable predictions for a theory of `culture as shared beliefs.' In particular, one challenge for
testing theories of culture is the diculty of measuring people's beliefs, which is about as hard as
measuring people's preferences or private benets. The predictions above get around that issue by
using a person's pre-merger rm as an indirect indicator for his or her beliefs.
By nature, the economic approach in this paper focuses (on purpose) on a specic denition of
corporate culture and on a specic set of causal mechanisms. Such focused approach has both costs
and benets. On the benets side, it leads to a very transparent analysis and to very specic pre-
dictions. On the cost side, the analysis may omit potentially important elements and mechanisms.
In particular, an implicit assumption, which cannot be checked on principle but requires further
theoretical or empirical analysis, is that the mechanisms in this paper are suciently orthogonal
4to those that are not considered to make such reduced or focused analysis useful. One potential
indirect (though not necessarily conclusive) test of this condition are the theory's predictions them-
selves: if the assumption is wrong (in a relevant way) then that should cause the predictions to be
rejected. I return to this issue in the discussion of the literature.
The Literature. The role of culture clash in mergers and acquisitions has received considerable
attention in the management literature (see Schoenberg (2000), Schweiger and Goulet (2000), and
Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) for reviews and references). Most of this research has focused
on the `cultural distance' hypothesis, which says that larger cultural dierences should consistently
lead to more costs and higher risks in cross-cultural interactions (Hofstede 1980). The empirical
results, however, have been inconclusive or even inconsistent (Stahl and Voigt 2004, Teerikangas and
Very 2006), which has been attributed to the lack of clarity on what is or should be tested, both in
terms of the culture concept and in terms of the outcomes. Most of the research, for example, uses
some measure of national culture as the independent variable and focuses on overall performance {
instead of more detailed outcomes { as the dependent variable. One way to deal with these issues,
as suggested by Teerikangas and Very (2006), is to enrich the analysis, for example by explicitly
incorporating the multi-level nature of culture or by explicitly incorporating the dynamic nature
of culture clash. This paper follows the alternative approach of trying to simplify rather than to
enrich. I focus, in particular, on a very simple notion of corporate culture and study more detailed,
lower-level outcomes. While such approach reduces the richness of the issues, the hope is that it
may give a solid understanding of at least part of the phenomenon. How important that part is, is
an empirical issue. It is encouraging in this respect that the theory is able to generate a wide range
of implications and that Van den Steen (2005a) { which used the same approach { recovered many
stylized facts on corporate culture. These observations suggest that this may potentially capture
an important part of the issues, at least from a performance perspective. Relative to this existing
management literature, the contribution of this paper is then to systematically derive { by means
of a simple formal model { a wide range of results on the eects of culture and culture clash.
Apart from the management literature on culture clash, this paper also builds on, and adds
to, the economic literature on agency, which has studied several of the outcomes in this paper in
5more detail. Both Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dessein (2002), for example, consider the impact
of `congruence of objectives' in their models of delegation and show that managers delegate more
when the objectives are more similar. Crawford and Sobel (1982) studied communication between
players with dierent objectives and concluded that communication is more informative when
the players' preferences are more similar. This is closely related to the problems of relying on the
information of an interested party (Milgrom and Roberts 1986). Rotemberg and Saloner (1995) and
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) showed that dierent preferences may increase players' incentives
to collect information, although diering beliefs introduce a truly new dimension (Van den Steen
2002). Finally, Cr emer (1993) shows that shared information may improve the alignment of actions
in a team-theoretic model, which may be interpreted as coordination. Of these contributions,
only Cr emer (1993) considered the relationship to corporate culture. While the current paper
adds new results to this agency literature, such as the eect of homogeneity on experimentation,
on coordination, on inuence activities, and on the incentives to collect information, its main
contribution in this area is (in my view) the fact that it looks at the agency literature from a
dierent angle { by taking homogeneity, or shared beliefs and values, as a key common theme
throughout the literature { and that it thus links the agency literature as a whole to the widely
studied phenomenon of corporate culture. This paper is to my knowledge the rst to suggest this
link between the general agency problem on the one hand and corporate culture on the other.
The relationship of the management and economic literature on corporate culture itself { such
as Burns and Stalker (1961), Donaldson and Lorsch (1983), Schein (1985), Kreps (1990), Kotter
and Heskett (1992), Cr emer (1993), Lazear (1995), Carrillo and Gromb (1999), Hermalin (2001),
Rob and Zemsky (2002) { to the current view of culture as homogeneity is discussed in depth in
Van den Steen (2005a), which studies sorting and shared experience as sources of homogeneity.
This literature on corporate culture has, with the exception of Cr emer (1993) and Hermalin (2001),
been very informal about the costs and benets of culture. Kotter and Heskett (1992), for example,
describe some benets of a strong culture, such as the fact that `employees tend to march to the
same drummer' or that `shared values and behaviors make people feel good about working for a
rm', but without being specic about the mechanisms and thus about the conditions when this
is more or less likely to happen. Analogously, Kreps (1990) claims informally that culture (dened
6as a rule to apply in unforseen contingencies) can help with coordination and with protecting
employees against abuses by their superiors. Hermalin (2001) formally analyzes eects of corporate
culture but from a very dierent angle than this paper. In particular, Hermalin (2001) assumes
that adoption of culture lowers a rm's overall marginal cost but raises its overall xed cost and
then analyzes which rms will adopt culture and how competition in culture will play out. Relative
to this literature, the contribution of this paper is both to be more explicit (through its formal
approach and its very simple model) and to be more systematic about the costs and benets of
culture { dened explicitly as shared beliefs and values { and culture clash.
There is nally also a (smaller) economic literature on dierent aspects of leadership and vision
and their relationship to homogeneity, but the study of performance eects has essentially been
incidental in this literature. Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) show how a manager's biased beliefs
give employees who happen to work on the projects that are favored by those beliefs incentives to
work hard. Van den Steen (2001, 2005) shows 1) how a manager's beliefs inuence what projects
employees actually choose, 2) how the interaction between beliefs and utility attracts employees
with similar beliefs as those of the manager, and 3) how the resulting alignment of beliefs increases
utility, eort, and coordination. Besley and Ghatak (2005) assume that employees of a certain type
(which captures the employees' sense of mission) get higher private benets from success when
they work with a principal of a similar type and then show that, in equilibrium, there will be
assortative matching and employees who are matched with similar-minded principals will { thanks
to their intrinsic motivation { have lower-powered extrinsic incentives or work harder for the same
incentives. Relative to this literature, the current paper studies a much wider range of costs and
benets of homogeneity and also relates these results to culture clash.
The next section introduces the baseline model and studies a series of variations to derive
the dierent eects. In particular, subsections 2.2 through 2.8 study the eects of homogeneity
on delegation, monitoring, eort, utility, information collection, experimentation, coordination,
inuence activities, and communication. Subsection 2.9 shows which results extend to the situation
where players have diering preferences instead of diering beliefs. Section 3 translates the results
to implications for culture clash, while section 4 concludes.
72 Costs and Benets of Homogeneity
2.1 The Baseline Model
I present here the baseline model, on which I will build { in the next subsections { a number of
variations to identify dierent costs and benets of homogeneity. This baseline model captures the
situation of a group of people who are engaged in a joint project. While one of them is the formal
leader or manager, all of them care to some degree about the nal success of the project. To keep
the exposition focused, I will henceforth assume that this joint project is actually a rm, although
the model could also capture, for example, an alliance or long-term market relationship.
Consider thus a rm that consists of a manager, denoted M, and J members, denoted 1 through
J. The rm will face a choice between two mutually exclusive courses of action { or ways of doing
things { a 2 fA;Bg. For example, action A could be the status quo while action B is the use
of a new technology or the launch of a new product. Or action A is punishing failure to keep
people focused while action B is rewarding failure to encourage innovation. Who makes this choice
depends on the eect under study and will thus be specied in the later subsections.
Actions A and B each pay some prot Z > 0 upon success and 0 upon failure and have respective
probabilities of success A;B 2 [0;1]. The actions A and B thus have expected payos ZA and
ZB where Z essentially measures how important the decision is. The probability of success A of
action A is a random variable A  U[0;1] and is publicly drawn before the decision. All players
will thus agree on the value of A by the time the choice between A and B is made, as indicated in
Figure 1. This assumption simplies the exposition and analysis but is not necessary for the results.
The value of B 2 [0;1], on the other hand, is unknown but each player has a subjective belief
about B. Let rB;i be player i's expected value for B.3 These (prior) beliefs are commonly known
and may dier across players. In other words, players can agree to disagree on the probability
that the new product or technology will be a success or on the eect that punishing failure has on
long-term protability. Aumann (1976) showed that such open disagreement requires that players
have diering priors. I will discuss this diering priors assumption below.
Each member of the organization, say i, is risk-neutral and cares about the rm's overall payo.
3In most of the paper only the expected value of B matters. I will make more specic assumptions when the full
distribution matters.
81 2 3
The value of A is revealed. Choice between A and B. Payos are realized.
Figure 1: Timing of baseline game.
In particular, assume that i gets a share i of the rm's payo. The assumption that employees
care about the rm's success reects, for example, the fact that their future income within the rm
and their future market wages typically depend on their rm's success.4 To break ties, I will also
assume that when otherwise indierent, each player chooses or prefers A.
As discussed later, most of the results also obtain when employees do not disagree on the optimal
course of action (and care about rm performance) but instead have personal preferences for A or
for B. Such personal preferences over actions can capture, among other things, the players' values.
Measuring Similarity of Beliefs Since homogeneity of beliefs is at the core of this analysis, I
need a measure for the similarity of two players' beliefs. To that purpose, I will use the Euclidean
distance between the means of the beliefs of i and j
i;j = jrB;i   rB;jj
Apart from being intuitive and well-known, this measure is also very eective in the current context
since all results can be expressed directly in terms of i;j. Moreover, it turns out that the probability
that players i and j undertake the same action is (1   i;j), so that this measure ts well with the
idea of culture as `the way we do things around here'. This establishes a direct equivalence with
the measure used in Van den Steen (2005a).
The Diering Priors Assumption The model assumes that people can openly disagree, i.e,
they can agree to disagree, which requires players to have diering priors (Aumann 1976).5
4These preferences could be endogenized by allowing the players to contract on compensation, but at the cost
of considerable added complexity. Since this does not seem to generate important new insights in the context of
this paper and since the exogenous preferences are also of independent importance, I just keep it as an exogenous
assumption.
5The assumption that players have no private information is made for analytical convenience. If players also had
private information, they would update their beliefs but disagreement would remain (Morris 1997).
9The assumption of (unbiased) diering priors captures the fact that people may have dierent
`mental models' or `belief systems' or dierent intuition which leads people with identical data to
draw dierent conclusions. Consider, for example, a manager's belief whether a particular person
or group of people is trustworthy and how that may inuence her decision whether to do business
with that person or group. Or whether a particular new technology or recent development will
break through. This kind of issues and the consequent potential for open disagreement is common in
organizations, especially for questions of strategy or organizational policy. Indeed, the fundamental
role of `belief systems' or `mental models' in organizations has been stressed by academic studies of
managers and managerial decision making (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983, Schein 1985).6 This thus
makes diering priors a very natural setup to study organizations and their potential conicts.
While the diering priors assumption is not so common in economics, it does have a long
tradition with, among others, Arrow (1964), Wilson (1968), Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian
(1989), Morris (1994, 1997), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Yildiz (2003), Van den Steen (2004),
Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Boot, Gopalan, and Thakor (2006), and Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2006). There has been a rapid rise in recent years, in part due to the growing popularity
of behavioral economics which often implicitly assumes diering priors. There is also a burgeoning
empirical literature such as Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) or Landier and Thesmar (2009). The
logical and epistemic foundations have been discussed in, among others, Morris (1994), Gul (1998),
Yildiz (2000), and Van den Steen (2001).
A natural question is where such diering priors would come from in a Bayesian framework?
There are two ways to think about this. Since the prior for this game is a posterior from earlier
updating, many forms of bounded rationality (of which the player is not aware) will lead to diering
priors, even when starting from a common prior. Unconsciously forgetting some of the data used
to update beliefs, for example, would do. A second { more philosophical and more controversial {
argument is that people may be born with diering priors: in the absence of information there is
6Open disagreement is obviously not limited to organizational or management issues. Most of us strongly be-
lieve that the earth revolves around the sun rather than the other way around. There was a time that people
believed the opposite equally strongly. And few of us actually have rst-hand experience with this phenomenon.
We all hold these very strong beliefs `on authority'. Not everyone is equally convinced however, as is illustrated
by the website www.xedearth.com. Equally surprising to many are the dierences in beliefs about evolution
(http:www.religioustolerance.org/ev publi.htm), even among college-educated adults.
10no reason to agree and priors are just primitives of a model. In this paper I am agnostic about the
source of the disagreement and just explore its consequences.
A nal question is why players don't simply discuss and collect new data until they reach
agreement. The choice here is essentially a time and cost trade-o, and in many cases persuasion
or discussion is just not the right option. In particular, many important beliefs are deeply en-
grained and dicult to change, while further data collection may be prohibitively costly and time
consuming. Moreover, the process of convergence of beliefs is more complex than it may seem at
rst sight.7 So it will often be more eective to just allocate decision rights to a person than to try
to reach consensus. Imagine the deadlock if a Dean or CEO could only make a decision if there is
full and true unanimity in the organization.
I now turn to the analysis of the dierent eects of homogeneity in such a context, starting
with delegation and monitoring.
2.2 Delegation and Monitoring
Delegation is, to the rst order, a trade-o between losing personal control over the decision and
having the most appropriate person make the decision. The cost of losing personal control is that,
due to diering priors or preferences, the delegee may choose a dierent action than the delegator
would. The gain from delegating the decision to the most appropriate person can take dierent
forms. For example, Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Van den Steen (2006) showed that delegation
may increase respectively the incentives to collect information and the incentives to implement or
execute the project, while Dessein (2002) considered the case that the delegee has more information.
The simplest motivation is actually that decision-making takes time and eort, especially if follow-
up is necessary to make sure the decision gets implemented. If lower level employees have a lower
(opportunity) cost of time and eort then it is ecient to delegate. To capture that latter situation,
7While in most cases, more data tend to lead to convergence, this is denitely not guaranteed in a setting with
diering priors. There are indeed both empirical (Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979) and theoretical (Diaconis and
Freedman 1986, Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz 2006) reasons why that may not be the case. Acemoglu,
Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2006) show, for example, how potential disagreement over the interpretation of new
information is sucient to prevent convergence. The psychology literature on polarization shows empirically how
dierential reading of identical information may sometimes lead to divergence. This does not mean that convergence
will not happen, only that it is a more dicult process than often imagined. This will particularly be the case when the




a M decides whether to delegate.
b M chooses level of monitoring eort e.
(Cost c(e) sunk.)
2
Action Choice and Payos
a The value of A is revealed.
b Choice between A and B.
c Payos are realized.
Figure 2: Timing for delegation and monitoring.
I will simply assume here that centralization of the decision causes an exogenously specied cost
cc  0 to the manager.8
Once a manager has delegated the decision, she can still inuence the outcome by monitoring the
delegee. Such monitoring is an intermediate option between completely centralized and completely
decentralized decision making. For simplicity, I assume that monitoring gives the manager with
some probability a chance to `correct' the employee, i.e., to make sure that the employee takes the
decision that the manager would have taken.
To formalize this delegation and monitoring setting, consider the following variation on the
model in Subsection 2.1, with timing as in Figure 2. At the start of the game, manager M decides
whether to delegate the decision to employee i or to keep the decision centralized (at cost cc to
the manager). If M decides to delegate, she can still monitor i. In particular, when M spends
personal eort e  0 on monitoring, at a private cost c(e), M can with probability P(e) 2 [0;1]
force i to take the action which M believes is best. Assume that P(0) = c(0) = 0, P0(e);c0(e) > 0,
and P00(e) < 0  c00(e). To break ties, I also assume that when otherwise indierent, the manager
delegates and/or does not monitor.
The following proposition then says that the manager will delegate if the employee's beliefs are
suciently similar to her own and that, conditional on delegation, the manager will monitor less
these employees who have more similar beliefs.
Proposition 1 There exists a ^  such that the manager M delegates to employee i i the dierence
in beliefs M;i  ^ . When the decision is delegated and for given rB;M, the level of monitoring e by
M increases in the belief heterogeneity M;i.
8Here and elsewhere, whether costs are incurred by the organization or privately does not aect the qualitative
results. The choice is made based on analytical convenience and how natural each assumption is.
































































when delegating and exerting eort e at monitoring. Since this expected payo is supermodular in e and M;i, the
optimal monitoring eort ^ e will increase in M;i. Applying the envelope theorem shows that the payo from delegation
decreases in M;i. Since the expected payo from centralization is MZ
1+r2
B;M
2   cc, there will indeed be a ^  such
that M delegates i M;i  ^ . This implies the proposition. 
The intuition for the result is that as the manager and employee have more dierent beliefs, the
employee is more likely to make the wrong choice from the manager's perspective. Belief dierences
thus give the manager more reason to keep control, either by not delegating or by monitoring.
It also follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that more important decisions (i.e., decisions with
higher Z) will be less delegated and more monitored. An interesting variation from an empirical
point of view is a situation where the manager faces a number of decisions with dierent importance
(i.e., decisions with dierent Z) and can choose among a number of employees with dierent M;i
(where each employee can make { and thus be delegated { only one decision).
Proposition 2 The manager will delegate more important decisions to employees with lower M;i,
i.e. to employees with more similar beliefs.
Proof : This follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 1. 
132.3 Eort and Utility
Culture and culture clash will also aect employees' motivation and satisfaction, i.e., their eort
and expected utility. In particular, when an organization needs to choose a course of action and
the members of that organization fundamentally disagree on the right course of action, then at
least some members will feel that the organization goes down the wrong path. This lowers their
expected utility from being part of the organization and will lower their motivation since they will
feel that their eort is spent on the wrong project.
To study these ideas formally, consider the model of Subsection 2.1 where the decision is always
made by the manager M. Let me focus rst on the eect of belief dierences on expected utility.
The following proposition says that employee i's expected utility (or satisfaction) decreases with
the dierence in belief between the employee and the manager.
Proposition 3 For a given employee i with belief rB;i, i's expected utility decreases with the dif-
ference in belief M;i.








, which implies the result. 
To study the eect of the homogeneity of beliefs on eort (or motivation), consider again the setting
of Subsection 2.1 with M as the decision maker. Assume that, simultaneously with M's decision,
employee i can spend eort e  0 on implementing or executing the project, at a private cost
c(e). In particular, let the project payo now be ZQ(e)a. Assume that Q(0)  0, c(0) = 0,
Q0(e);c0(e) > 0, and Q00(e) < 0  c00(e). Note that eort is assumed to be a complement to the
quality of the decision: eort is worth more on a project with high a than on a project with low
a. This reects the idea of implementation eort or execution eort: implementing a good project
has a higher payo than implementing a bad project.
The following proposition then says that implementation eort increases as beliefs of manager
and employee are more similar.
Proposition 4 For a given employee i with belief rB;i, i's eort e decreases in M;i.








  c(e), which implies the result by monotone
comparative statics (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). 
14These results t the account by Collins and Porras (1994) of organizations with a strong culture.
In particular, they painted a picture of energized organizations with high levels of satisfaction, but
also pointed out that people who don't t in tend to feel the polar opposite. The results are also
related to Van den Steen (2005b) who showed how, due to these utility dierences, a manager's
strong belief leads to sorting in the labor market { attracting employees with similar beliefs { and
how that alignment then leads on its turn to higher eort and utility.
While the analysis up to this point identied utility, eort, delegation, and monitoring as benets
of homogeneity, and thus of a strong culture, there are also costs. Some of these are analyzed in
the next two subsection, which study information collection and experimentation.
2.4 Information Collection
A rst important benet of dierences in beliefs { or open disagreement { is that it makes people
(who care about the outcome) collect more information to `convince' the other players. The intuition
is that each player expects that, on average, the newly collected data will conrm his or her belief
and thus `convince' the other player, i.e., move the belief of the other player closer to his own (Van
den Steen 2002, Che and Kartik 2007). This `convincing' eect is unique to a situation with open
disagreement or diering priors and is very dierent from the eects in inuence-type models such
as Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Rotemberg and Saloner (1995), or Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).9
To see this formally, consider again a variation on the model of Subsection 2.1 with the manager
M as the decision maker. Employee i can publicly collect new information at the very start of the
game, i.e., prior to the realization of A. Assume in particular that when i spends eort e  0,
at private cost c(e), then with probability P(e) 2 [0;1] both i and M will observe the outcome
of an experiment on B (which, by nature, follows a binomial distribution with parameter B). As
before, assume that P(0) = c(0) = 0, P0(e);c0(e) > 0, and P00(e) < 0  c00(e). To formally analyze
the incentive to collect such information, the full distribution of the players' belief about B also
needs to be specied. To keep the analysis tractable, I will assume that each player j's prior follows
a Beta distribution with parameters (rB;jN;(1   rB;j)N). This is equivalent to assuming that j
9These models rely either on the fact that the players can bias the information collection (by choosing from biased
sources or by only reporting favorable information) or on the fact that collecting extra information introduces an
element of randomness, which is good if your favorite action is currently lagging.
15started from a uniform prior on B and observed N experiments of which a proportion rB;j were
a success. The following proposition then says that employee i's eort to collect more information
(to convince his manager) increases with the dierence in beliefs between himself and his manager.
Proposition 5 For a given employee i with belief rB;i, the eort e that i spends on collecting
information increases in the level of belief heterogeneity M;i.
Proof : Let ^ rB;j(rB;j;X) with X 2 fS;Fg denote j's updated belief after a success (S) or failure (F). With a
Beta prior (that corresponds to N observations), it follows that ^ rB;j(rB;j;S) =
NrB;j+1
N+1 and ^ rB;j(rB;j;F) =
NrB;j
N+1 .
To simplify calculations, I will normalize utility by iZ. Employee i's expected normalized utility upon a success is

























































































2 which is strictly positive and strictly
increasing in M;i. This proves the proposition. 
The gain from collecting information { derived in the proof { consists of two terms. The rst term,
which contains the factor rB;i(1   rB;i), is the benet from reducing the variance of the beliefs,
i.e., the gain from having a more precise estimate. The second term, which contains M;i, is the
gain from convincing the other player. In particular, each player believes that he will convince the
other since each believes { by denition { that, on average, the data will conrm his view (over
the belief of the other player). The gain from this `convincing eect' increases as the players have
more dierent beliefs: there is no gain from convincing someone who already agrees with you.
162.5 Experimentation
A second important benet of having a diversity of beliefs in the organization is that there will
be more experimentation.10 While a full formal analysis of experimentation typically requires a
multi-period model with a larger range of actions, the key point and the key mechanism in this
paper can actually be captured in this simple one-period setting. In particular, experimentation is
essentially about trying dierent things and learning about the payos of dierent actions. I will
show here that when players have more dierent beliefs, they will indeed experiment more in this
sense of trying more dierent things and learning more about the payos of dierent actions.
To see this formally, consider a variation on the baseline model of Subsection 2.1 where two
players, i and j, both simultaneously choose an action and the overall payo of the organization is
the average of the payos of the two actions. Formally, let Yi denote the action chosen by player i,
then the organization's payo is Z(Yi + Yj)=2.
Proposition 6 The expected number of actions tried increases in the belief heterogeneity i;j.
Proof : Since the rm's payo increases in both actions' payos and since each player is risk-neutral and cares
about the organization-wide payo, each player will simply choose the action that he believes is most likely to be a
success. Let, without loss of generality, rB;i  rB;j. The probability that the players will choose dierent actions is
then
R rB;j
rB;i du = i;j. It follows indeed that the expected number of actions tried increases in i;j. 
In the context of experimentation, one should obviously be very careful about assuming risk-
neutrality and especially about assuming that players care about organization-wide payos. In-
troducing risk aversion in this model would have two counter-acting eects. First, players would
nd it optimal to choose more dierent actions in order to diversify risk. Second, however, players
would also prefer actions with low uncertainty, which pushes towards choosing the better-known
action. Both these eects would shift the amount of experimentation but do not seem to aect
the comparative static with respect to i;j. Assuming that people care about their own payo
rather than the organization-wide payo, on the other hand, would cause players to free-ride on
the experimentation of others. Again, my conjecture is that this eect will move the average level
10I thank Gustavo Manso for the interesting discussions and suggestions on this issue. For an insightful analysis of
how incentives interact with experimentation, see Manso (2006).
17of experimentation, but preserve the comparative statics with respect to homogeneity of beliefs
identied here. These issues require more formal study.
2.6 Coordination
An important and intriguing conjecture about corporate culture is that rms with a strong culture
have an easier time coordinating (Kotter and Heskett (1992) and others). This conjecture obviously
moves us back from the costs to the benets of homogeneity and culture.
The study of coordination is more complex than it may seem at rst since coordination can take
on many forms and there is no obvious one best way to think about it. One very simple approach
to coordination is to conceptualize it as the alignment of two actions in a continuous space, as is
often done in team theory (Marschak and Radner 1972). The typical formulation is one in which
the joint objective function of two players i and j has a term  (xi   xj)2 where xi;xj 2 R are the
simultaneous action choices of the players. Using such model, Cr emer (1993) shows how shared
information can improve alignment. His model could also be used to show that the players' actions
are more aligned when their prior beliefs are more similar, as measured by i;j. While this is a very
tractable approach, it has the disadvantage that it can be dicult to match this model with real
settings. For example, without the assumption that the cost of miscoordination is convex, which is
often dicult to defend, the game tends to have multiple equilibria and the coordination problem
just shifts from aligning xi and xj to coordinating on an equilibrium.
I will use here an alternative approach (that { as a side-benet { can actually deal with some
of the issues identied above). I start, in particular, from a non-cooperative 2-by-2 coordination
game, as in Figure 3. In this case, two players simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose between
two possible actions, A and B. They both strictly prefer to choose the same action, as implied
by the expected utility inequalities in Figure 3. It follows that the game has two pure strategy
equilibria: AA and BB. The problem is that the players may have diering beliefs about the
payos (or dierent preferences over the equilibria). In particular, player 1 may believe that
E1[u1(AA)] > E1[u1(BB)], while 2 believes that E2[u2(BB)] > E2[u2(AA)]. This leads to obvious
coordination issues. For example, while player 1 prefers the AA equilibrium he may choose B in
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Figure 3: Coordination Game
may make the symmetric reasoning and end up choosing A instead. After a few tries, however,
one would expect players to coordinate on one or the other equilibrium. The overall conjecture is
now that coordination is easier if the players' beliefs are more similar. Analytically, the challenge
is that there is no established methodology to measure the `diculty of coordination' for such non-
cooperative coordination setting. The purpose of this subsection is to suggest and apply a method
to do exactly that: measure the diculty of coordination when there are multiple equilibria. The
approach is based on the experimental and theoretical literature on learning to play equilibria and
on equilibrium selection. While the focus of that literature is to determine which equilibrium will
be selected, these theories also inform us implicitly about the diculty of actually reaching the
selected equilibrium. I derive on theoretical grounds a measure for the diculty of coordination
which is consistent with both literatures and which is easily tractable. To that purpose, consider
the general coordination game in Figure 3 where AA and BB are the two equilibria.
My starting point is the theory of learning. While most models that have been developed in
that literature tend to give very similar results in this context, I will focus here for simplicity
on models of belief-based learning, which correspond to  = 1 in the EWA model (Camerer and
Ho 1998). In such belief-based learning models, each player tries to form beliefs regarding the
other player's behavior, based on the other's past behavior. A typical example of this approach
{ which is essentially the basis of my formal analysis { is the following. Each player starts from
the belief that the other will play each action with equal probability. Each player then chooses his
best response to these beliefs. Upon observing the other player's action, each player updates his
19beliefs about what the other will do. When updating, both attach strictly positive and identical
weights to their priors. Each player could, for example, assume that his prior belief corresponds to
N previous observations of action choices. Given their new beliefs, the players choose again actions
and update their beliefs. They continue to do so until they coordinate on an equilibrium. If player
1 originally chooses A and player 2 originally chooses B, then the time (i.e., the number of tries)











and analogously if 1 chooses B and 2 chooses A. Finally, the time is zero when they prefer the
same action. It turns out that the players in this case actually coordinate on the risk-dominant
equilibrium as N ! 1 i.e. as they learn suciently slowly. This process is thus related to the
tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), which is among the most inuential theories of
equilibrium selection. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) predict that players will select equilibrium AA







Comparing equations (1) and (2) shows that the measure for expected time to coordination is
closely related to a natural measure for how strongly one equilibrium risk dominates another,
which is reassuring for a theory on how easy it is to coordinate.
To now formally study coordination in this particular context, consider the following situation.
Players i and j have to decide independently which action to choose. The organization's payo is
again the average of the two players' payos but now plus an extra payo of 1 when the players'
actions match. The payo matrix (in terms of subjective expected utilities) is thus as in Figure 4.
Proposition 7 The expected time to coordination increases in the level of belief heterogeneity i;j.














2 1+ rB;i, 1+ rB;j
Figure 4: Payo Matrix
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which increases in i;j. So it follows that the expected time to coordination increases in i;j. The argument for the
case with rB;i > rB;j is completely analogous after switching players and actions. 
The intuition for this result is that a smaller dierence in beliefs implies that a) the players are more
likely to prefer the same equilibrium and b) when they do prefer dierent equilibria, the players are
less likely to have a strong preference for one equilibrium over the other. As a consequence, they are
more likely either to coordinate immediately (when they prefer the same equilibrium) or to settle
quickly (when they prefer dierent equilibria but neither has a strong preference). Coordination is
thus easier with more homogenous beliefs.
212.7 Inuence Activities
The nal two results are both about the eect of homogeneity on actions to get one's way. In
particular, when people in an organization disagree on the optimal approach, they will spend time
and eort to try to inuence decisions in the direction that they believe is best. Such actions are
generically called `inuence activities' (Milgrom and Roberts 1988). These actions can take the
form of biased communication, personal or social pressure, alliances with implicit quid pro quos,
etc. While this subsection considers generic inuence activities, the next subsection will consider
the special case of distorted communication. The key hypothesis here is that the level of inuence
activities will decrease as beliefs are more homogenous since people will less often disagree on the
optimal approach and thus have less reason to try to inuence the course of action.
To study generic inuence activities formally, assume that someone in the organization { say
employee j { will make the action choice and that employee i can aect that action choice by
spending eort e  0 on `inuence activities' at private cost c(e). Assume that j will then un-
dertake i's preferred action with probability R(e) 2 [0;1] and her own preferred action with the
complementary probability. As before again, assume that R(0) = c(0) = 0, R0(e);c0(e) > 0, and
R00(e) < 0  c00(e). The timing is indicated in Figure 5.
1 2 3 4
Employees i chooses
e.
The value of A is re-
vealed.
Employee j chooses
between A and B, as
inuenced by e.
Payos are realized.
Figure 5: Timing of inuence game.
The following proposition then says that inuence activities indeed increase when players have
more heterogenous beliefs.
Proposition 8 For a given employee i with belief rB;i, i's eort on inuence activities increases
in the belief heterogeneity i;j.





















so that the result follows by monotone comparative statics. 
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Communication
a Information ^ r is revealed to employee i (with prob-
ability p).
b Employee i decides whether to communicate to M.
c Manager M updates her information.
2
Action Choice and Payos
a The value of A is revealed.
b Manager M chooses between A and B.
c Payos are realized.
Figure 6: Timing of communication game.
2.8 Communication
An important special case of inuence activities is distortion in communication. In particular,
employees may communicate only those pieces of information that move the beliefs of the decision
maker closer to their own. It is useful to study this case separately, both because communication
distortion is a very important type of inuence activity and because focusing on this particular
context gives a more precise prediction.
To study this phenomenon, consider the following variation on the baseline model, with timing
as in Figure 6. The manager is again the decision maker. With probability p 2 (0;1), however,
employee i has private information regarding B. In particular, in that case, employee i observed
the outcome of an experiment on B, ^ r 2 f0;1g, much like in Subsection 2.4. (Remember that such
experiment follows by nature a binary distribution with parameter B.) I will also again assume
that the prior of a player j is the Beta distribution with parameters (rB;jN;(1   rB;j)N). Player
j will then update her expected value to rB;j + (1   )^ r where  = N=(N + 1).
Employee i can (costlessly) communicate this information ^ r, if he has any, and such communi-
cation veriably reveals all the available information. Employee i independently decides whether
or not to communicate the information, but absent such communication M does not know whether
i actually had private information or not. Finally, I assume for deniteness that in the presence of
multiple equilibria the manager can force the equilibrium that she prefers.
The following proposition then says that employee i will more often hide information when he
diers more in belief from the manager.
Proposition 9 For given rB;M, the probability of communication decreases in the belief hetero-
geneity M;i.
23Proof : To simplify the analysis, I will again normalize the expected utilities by iZ. I now rst determine
the optimal communication strategy for player i. Obviously, if i does not have a private signal, then he cannot
communicate it. Condition therefore on i having a private signal ^ r 2 f0;1g.
Note that any time that i communicates ^ r, M updates her expected value to ~ rB;M = rB;M + (1   )^ r so that i's





I will now rst argue that it cannot be an equilibrium that i never communicates (upon receiving a signal). In such
equilibrium, M would not update her beliefs when not receiving a signal and i's expected payo (upon receiving a
signal ^ r but not communicating it) would equal
Ui;nc =






2 + (1   )
2(rB;M   ^ r)
2 + 2(1   )(rB;M   rB;i)(rB;M   ^ r)
2
For this to be an equilibrium, this latter expected utility must be always larger than the expected utility from
communicating, i.e., it must always be that Ui;nc  Ui;c or 0 
(1 )2(rB;M ^ r)2+2(1 )(rB;M rB;i)(rB;M ^ r)
2 . To see
now that `never communicate' cannot be an equilibrium, note that for any set of parameters, there exists an outcome
^ r that violates this condition, namely ^ r = 0 when rB;M  rB;i and ^ r = 1 when rB;M  rB;i.
Consider next the potential equilibrium where i communicates i the signal ^ r = 1. Let NC (`No Communication')
denote the event that i does not communicate. Consider now manager M's updated belief upon no communication.
Using Y/N to indicate whether the employee does get a signal or not, this becomes
EM[B j NC] = EM[B j NC&Y ]P(Y ) + EM[B j NC&N]P(N) = rB;Mp + rB;M(1   p)
I now rst argue that this cannot be an equilibrium when rB;M  rB;i because a player i with a signal ^ r = 0 will want to






while his expected utility when not communicating equals




















2 + (1   )(rB;M   rB;i)rB;M(1   p)
2
So this player will want to communicate if
(1 )2r2
B;M(1 p)2+(1 )(rB;M rB;i)rB;M(1 p)
2  0 which is always the case
when rB;M  rB;i. From this and the fact that `never communicate' cannot be an equilibrium, it follows that in
any equilibrium with rB;M  rB;i, player i will always communicate when ^ r = 0. A completely analogous argument
implies that in any equilibrium with rB;M  rB;i, the player i will always communicate when ^ r = 1.
I will now derive the equilibrium. Consider the case when rB;M  rB;i. The equilibrium is completely pinned down
once it is determined what player i does upon receiving a signal ^ r = 1. Consider rst the potential equilibrium where
24i communicates if the signal ^ r = 0. Using Y/N to indicate whether the employee does get a signal or not, M's
updated belief upon no communication becomes
EM[B j NC] = EM[B j NC&Y ]P(Y ) + EM[B j NC&N]P(N) = rB;M + (1   )(p + rB;M(1   p))
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(1   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2
So he prefers not to communicate i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2 which is always greater than zero.
So whenever M;i is suciently large in this sense, there exists an equilibrium (for rB;M > rB;i) where i communicates
i he gets a signal that ^ r = 0.
Consider now the conditions under which there exists an equilibrium where i always communicates (for rB;M > rB;i).
Note that under such equilibrium, M infers from no communication that there was also no signal. Consider now a





If he does not communicate, his expected utility becomes














2 + (1   )
2(rB;M   ^ r)
2 + 2(1   )(rB;M   rB;i)(rB;M   ^ r)
2
Remember now from before that (for rB;M > rB;i) i will always communicate ^ r = 0. So I only have to consider ^ r = 1.
In that case, i prefers to communicate i















2 + (1   )
2(rB;M   ^ r)
2 + 2(1   )(rB;M   rB;i)(rB;M   ^ r)
2
or (1   )
2(rB;M   ^ r)
2 + 2(1   )(rB;M   rB;i)(rB;M   ^ r)  0 or
2(1 )(1 rB;M)
  M;i.
It follows that for rB;M  rB;i, `always communicate' is an equilibrium i M;i 
2(1 )(1 rB;M)
 while `communicate





So there is an overlapping region where both are an equilibrium. Given the assumption that the manager is able to
force the equilibrium selection that favors her, we have `always communicate' whenever there are multiple equilibria.
It follows that `always communicate' is the equilibrium i M;i 
2(1 )(1 rB;M)
 so that communication is indeed
more likely when M;i is smaller. 
Since communication is costless, i's decision to communicate (or not) is completely driven by his
attempt to inuence M's action choice. As with information collection, there is a trade-o between
giving M more information to make a better decision and `convincing' M by moving her belief
more towards one's own. Note that
(1 )
 is a measure of how much information the new signal
contains (on a relative basis). If this measure is large then i will tend to always communicate
^ r: the new signal is then so informative that it swamps any dierence in prior beliefs. When
this measure is small, however, i will only communicate ^ r if the signal moves M's belief in i's
direction: the signal then contains so little information, in a relative sense, that the dierence in
prior beliefs still dominates and i then uses the signal to `convince' M. To see now the eect of
homogeneity, note that as the prior beliefs are more dierent, the importance of dierences in prior
beliefs increases relative to the importance of new information so that i is more likely to try to bias
his communication and thus less likely to always communicate.
2.9 Beliefs versus Preferences/Values
The results up to this point were all about the eect of homogeneity of beliefs, i.e., about the
eect of `shared beliefs'. It turns out that, conveniently, many results can be extended quite easily
to homogeneity of preferences, i.e., to `shared values'. In particular, the following reinterpretation
translates many of the results to homogeneity of preferences or shared values. Let A and rB;i denote
the utilities that i gets when the rm undertakes respectively actions A and B and let i = 1. The
actions could be, for example, respectively an environmentally friendly and a polluting way of
implementing a particular project. With this modication, the following results for homogeneity
of preferences or `shared values' follow immediately.
 Managers will delegate more, and more important decisions, to employees with more similar
26preferences or values. When delegating, they also monitor such employees less.
 Utility and implementation eort (i.e., satisfaction and motivation) will be higher in organi-
zations with more homogenous preferences or values.
 Employees will coordinate more easily when their preferences or values are more similar.
 There will be less inuence activities in organizations with more similar preferences or values.
The other results either do not extend or require more fundamental modications to the model.
In particular, because they are inherently about information, the results on communication, exper-
imentation, and information collection all require (in their current formulation) rB;i to be inter-
preted as a belief in order to make sense. The result on information collection depends moreover
in a much deeper sense on the assumption that the rB;i are diering priors. In particular, the
intuition is deeply rooted in the fact that each player believes that new information will conrm
his view against that of the other. There does not seem to be any way to interpret or reformulate
this in terms of preferences.11
The reason why I formulated the baseline model in terms of beliefs rather than preferences
or values is twofold. First of all, the belief-based model is more easily reinterpreted in terms of
preferences or values than the other way around. Second, the idea that agency problems originate
in honest disagreement rather than in private benets is obviously very appealing in this managerial
and organizational context (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983).
3 Mergers and Culture Clash
With all these results in hand, I now return to the motivating research question: how will mergers
and acquisitions aect a rm's performance through the eect of culture clash? The logic to
translate the earlier results to the context of mergers and acquisitions is relatively straightforward.
In particular, building on the literature on corporate culture (Schein 1985, Kotter and Heskett
1992), Van den Steen (2005a) formally showed that rms will be more homogenous than society at
11Unless I assume that people engage literally in `wishful thinking' when it comes to future information, but that
implicitly assumes { biased { diering priors (regarding the expected realizations of future data).
27large, among other things because people prefer to work with others who have similar beliefs and
preferences, since such others will `make the right decisions'. Two randomly picked employees of
the same rm would thus be more likely to share beliefs than two randomly picked employees from
dierent rms. In other words, rms are internally homogenous but dierent from each others.
The earlier results can then be translated on two levels. First, on an individual level, the
degree of homogeneity will be larger (within the merged rm) between two people from the same
pre-merger rm than between two people from dierent pre-merger rms. This implies predictions
how the behavior of such people will dier, along the lines derived in the dierent subsections,
depending on which pre-merger rms they belonged to. Second, on an organization-wide level, the
overall degree of homogeneity will decrease through the merger. This implies predictions for the
average behavior throughout the organization. To make this more concrete, consider the example
of delegation. The predictions of the model will be that the average level of delegation will be lower
in the merged rm than in the independent rms and that, within the merged rm, a manager is
more likely to delegate to an employee from her own pre-merger rm than to an employee from the
other pre-merger rm.
To study this formally, I will embed the variations of Subsections 2.2 through 2.8 in a simple
merger game. The game starts from 2 rms with an equal number of J employees each. To x the
composition of each rm, imagine the following selection process for the manager and employees
of rm k. First, Mk, the manager for rm k, is drawn at random from a population of potential
managers with beliefs uniformly distributed on [0;1]. In other words, Mk's belief is realized
according to rB;Mk  U[0;1]. This manager will now hire the rm's J employees. The pool of
potential employees also have beliefs uniformly distributed on [0;1]. As part of the hiring and
selection process of a new employee, say j, manager Mk observes this potential employee j's (real
or hypothetical) choice from fA;Bg when A = :5. Mk can thus make inferences about rB;j, in
particular whether rB;j 2 [0;:5] or rB;j 2 (:5;1]. To capture the results of the literature on culture
as homogeneity (Schein 1985, Kotter and Heskett 1992, Van den Steen 2005a), I will assume that
the manager selects employees who share her belief on B: if rB;Mk 2 [0;:5] then Mk will select
potential employees with rB;j 2 [0;:5] so that rm k's employees' will be distributed rB;i  U[0;:5],
28and analogously for the other case.12 It is important to note that this distribution of (employee and
managerial) beliefs is an empirical distribution of prior beliefs and thus contains no information
about the true underlying value of B.13
The game now consists of two (hyper)stages. In the rst (hyper)stage, the two rms can merge.
I will assume that merging has some exogenous benet B. To simplify the analysis, I will consider
only B > Z so that it is always in the best interest of both rms to merge. After the rms merge,
the manager of the merged rm is selected at random from the two pre-merger managers, with each
manager being equally likely. The other manager leaves the game. In the second (hyper)stage, one
of the variations of Section 2 is played.
The proposition then makes two comparisons for each setting. First, it compares the average
outcome in the merged rm to the outcome in each of the two independent (i.e., non-merged)
rms. (A dierent way to express this formally is that it compares B > Z to the case that B < 0.)
Second, it compares the average outcome in the merged rm conditional on the two players coming
from the same pre-merger rm to the average outcome conditional on the two players coming from
dierent pre-merger rms. In all these comparisons, the employee(s) are randomly selected among
all the relevant rm employees. In particular, I do not allow the manager to select which employee
will participate in the interaction. The latter is denitely an interesting venue for further research.
The following proposition then states the results.
Proposition 10 The average probability that a manager delegates (in a Subsection 2.2 subgame
with a randomly selected employee) is higher in each of the independent rms than in the merged
rm. The manager of the merged rm is on average more likely to delegate when facing an employee
from her own pre-merger rm than when facing an employee from the other pre-merger rm.
The average expected utility and eort (in a Subsection 2.3 subgame) is lower in the merged
rm than in each of the independent rms. In the merged rm, an employee's utility and eort
12This would be the endogenous outcome of a search model in the style of Van den Steen (2005a) with suciently
low search costs if there was some probability that it is the employee who chooses the action.
An alternative specication is to assume that employees of rm k are randomly drawn according to a uniform
distribution over the subset Sk = [rB;Mk   ;rB;Mk + ]  [0;1]. This approach, however, leads to corner issues that
get analytically quite complex in this case (and hence may require the assumption that Sk is completely a subset of
[0;1]). The current specication avoids this complication.
13In particular, a player will not revise her or his beliefs upon meeting someone with a dierent prior. By extension,
a player will not revise her or his beliefs upon observing the empirical distribution of priors. See also Subsection 2.1.
29is on average lower when the employee and the manager are from dierent pre-merger rms than
when they are from the same pre-merger rm.
The average eort to collect information (in a Subsection 2.4 subgame) is higher in the merged
rm than in each of the independent rms. In the merged rm, the average eort to collect infor-
mation is lower when the employee and the manager are from the same pre-merger rm than when
they are from dierent pre-merger rms.
The expected number of actions tried per employee within one rm (in a Subsection 2.5 subgame)
is lower in each of the independent rms than in the merged rm. In the merged rm, two employees
from the same pre-merger rm are less likely to undertake dierent actions than two employees from
dierent pre-merger rms.
The average expected time to coordination (in a Subsection 2.6 subgame) between two randomly
selected employees is higher in the merged rm than in each of the independent rms. In the merged
rm, the average expected time to coordination is higher when the two involved employees are from
dierent pre-merger rms than when they are from the same pre-merger rm.
The average eort on inuence activities (in a Subsection 2.7 subgame) is higher in the merged
rm than in each of the independent rms. In the merged rm, the average eort on inuence
activities is higher when i and j are from dierent pre-merger rms than when they are from the
same pre-merger rm.
The average probability of communication (in a Subsection 2.8 subgame) is higher in each of the
independent rms than in the merged rm. In the merged rm, the probability of communication
is on average higher when the employee and the manager are from the same pre-merger rm than
when they are from dierent pre-merger rms.
Proof : Consider rst the result on delegation. The rst part of that result { that the probability of delegation is
lower in the merged rm than in each of the independent rms { is implied by the second part { that the manager
of the merged rm is on average more likely to delegate when facing an employee from her own pre-merger rm than
when facing an employee from the other pre-merger rm. To see this, note that the average probability of delegating
in each of the independent rms (which are completely symmetric) equals the expected probability of delegating in
the merged rm conditional on the manager of the merged rm facing an employee from her own pre-merger rm
(since the settings are on average identical). Furthermore, the average probability of delegating in the merged rm
is a weighted average of the probability of delegating when the manager faces an employee from her own pre-merger
30rm and the probability of delegating when the manager faces an employee from the other pre-merger rm. The
result then follows.
For the second part of the result on delegation, remember that the employees of each rm k are drawn either from
S1 = [0;:5) when rB;Mk 2 S1 or from S2 = (:5;1] when rB;Mk 2 S2 and that { following Proposition 1 { the
probability of centralization is an increasing function of M;i (since it is 0 for M;i  ^  and 1 for M;i > ^ ). It then
follows from Lemma 1 that the average probability of centralization (i.e., no delegation) by manager Mk is higher
for employees of his own pre-merger rm than for employees of the other pre-merger rm and strictly so when the
intervals of the two pre-merger rms diered. That proves the delegation part of the proposition. The proofs of the
other parts of the proposition are analogous. 
An important simplication in this analysis is the fact that the game has been formulated in
a way that makes the merger decision independent of the eventual second-stage game.14 While
anticipation of the second-stage game will obviously inuence the merger decision, it will be only
one of many considerations in that decision. The implicit assumption here is thus that the second-
stage game is a small factor relative to these other considerations. Since costs of culture clash,
when anticipated, make a merger less likely and benets make it more likely, the model predictions
overestimate costs and underestimate benets relative to what one should nd empirically.
An interesting observation here { which parallels the earlier observation that the benets of
homogeneity, and thus of a strong culture, tend to be more related to exploitation while the costs
tend to be more related to exploration { is that the costs of culture clash will tend to be felt
immediately, by an increase in agency costs, while its potential benets are realized only over the
longer term through experimentation and information collection. In particular, culture clash will
reduce the (shorter term) operational performance of the rm, but may lead over the longer term
to a better t with the environment. This also suggests that casual observation runs the risk of
overestimating the costs relative to the benets of culture clash (since the benets won't be observed
until much later).
14I thank Yuk-fai Fong for pointing out this implicit assumption.
314 Conclusion
This paper identied a series of specic costs and benets of homogeneity and used these results
to make concrete and testable predictions regarding the eects of culture clash in mergers and
acquisitions.
The surprisingly pervasive nature of `culture as homogeneity' { as identied in this paper { is
driven by the fact that any agency issue originates in a dierence in objectives between the princi-
pal and the agent and that shared beliefs and values will reduce such dierences in objectives and
thus fundamentally aect each and every type of agency issue, both positive and negative. The is-
sues considered in this paper are delegation, monitoring, motivation, satisfaction, experimentation,
information collection, coordination, communication, and inuence activities. This observation
suggests one simple reason why dening culture in terms of shared beliefs and values can be so
powerful.
The paper then translates these results to make specic predictions on the eects of culture
clash in mergers and acquisitions. An important overall observation is that the costs of culture
clash will typically show up immediately and aect mainly the operational eciency of the merged
rms. The benets of culture clash will take more time to emerge and will aect more the t with
the environment.
The paper clearly omits some important parts of the culture puzzle. Potential issues that come
to mind are the role of culture in identity and in inuencing one's preferences. These are interesting
venues for further research.
325 Appendix: Lemma
Let g be an increasing function with g(0)  0, i;j = jrB;i   rB;jj, M be a manager with belief
rB;M, and S1 = [0;:5) and S2 = (:5;1] be two intervals.
Lemma 1 If rB;i is drawn from a uniform distribution on Sk then E[g(M;i)] is strictly smaller
when rB;M 2 Sk than when rB;M 2 S k. If rB;i and rB;j are drawn from uniform distributions on
respectively Sk and Sl then E[g(i;j)] is strictly smaller when Sk = Sl than when Sk 6= Sl.
Proof : Assume, without loss of generality (since the case with S2 is completely symmetric), that rB;i is drawn
from a uniform distribution on S1.
Pick now one other player h (which can, for now, be either the manager M or an employee) with (xed) belief rB;h.











Note that this E[g(i;h)] is dierent from the E[g(i;j)] in the statement of the proposition since rB;h is xed (for
now) rather than drawn from a distribution on some Sl. A simple calculation of the derivatives for rB;h shows that


























follows that, for xed rB;h, E[g(i;h)] is always larger when rB;h 2 S2 than when rB;h 2 S1. This implies immediately
the rst part of the lemma by setting h = M. Moreover, by integrating over resp. S1 and S2, it also implies the
second part of the lemma, which completes this proof. 
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